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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY HOLLINGSWORTH 
d/b/a THE KING'S PALACE & 
RUSTY HANNA, et al., 
d/b/a THE SOCIETY OF 
LICENSED MASSEURS, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
THE CITY OF SOUTH SALT LAKE, 
a Municipal Corporation, 
CLINT BALMFORTH, and THE 
SOUTH SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT 
Defendants-Respondents. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
No. 16,831 
Appellants contest the validity of South Salt 
Lake City Ordinances regulating massage parlors, particularly 
those prohibiting massages by members of the opposite 
sex. This appeal arises from a judgment entered against 
appellants in the Third Judicial Court of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Judge Homer Wilkinson of the Third Judicial Court 
of Utah has sustained the validity of the South Salt 
Lake City Ordinances. His decision is based in part 
on a similar ordinance enacted by Salt Lake County. 
Judge Wilkinson also upheld the validity of the County 
Ordinances in the matter of Redwood Gym et al., v. Salt 
Lake County Commission et al. which is also pending 
before this court. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek an order reversing the decision 
of the Third Judicial Court, with instructions to 
declare sections of the revised ordinances of South 
Salt Lake null and void. Appellants alternatively 
reuqest that the matter be remanded to the Third Judicial 
Court of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents agree with appellants' statement of 
facts. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE UN1TED STATES SUPREME COURT HAS CPHELD 
OPPOSITE-SEX MASSAGE ORDINANCES. NUMEROUS JURISDICTIONS 
HAVE ALSO UPHELD THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SUCH ORDINANCES. 
The constitutionality of ordinances regulating 
opposite-sex massages has been affirmed and upheld by 
state and federal courts throughout the country. 
A landmark case dealing with such ordinances was 
the California Appellate Court decision of Ex parte Maki, 
56 Cal.A;;. 635, 133 P.2d 64 which stated at 64: 
The ordinance forbidding administration of 
mass~ges ~o persons of .opp~site sex is not unconstituti 
as violating the constitutional provisions that no 
perso~ shall on ac?ount of sex be disqualified from 
pursuing any vocation. Const. Art. 20 Sec. lS. 
-2-
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and further stating at 64: 
a(n) owner, convicted of violating ordinance 
by calling in a masseuse to administer massage 
to male patron, could not complain on ground 
that ordinance violated constitutional provisions 
that no person shall on account of sex be disqualified 
from pursuing any vocation. Const~ Art. 20, Sec. 18. 
Since this decision, this issue has been 
extensively litigated on all levels of the judicial 
system, and extended assertions of its constitutionality 
presented. Patterson v. Dallas, 355 S.W.2d 838 (Tex.Civ 
App 1962) , held that ordinance prohibiting opposite-sex 
massages in a massage establishment was not arbitrary, 
discriminatory, or unreasonable and did not violate 
due process clauses of state or federal constitutions, 
or deny equal protection of the law. (U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 
14.) . 
Further, cases on the state level have endorsed or 
adopted the constitutionality of regulatory statutes 
and ordinances: City of Houston v. Shober, 362 S.W.2d 
886 {Tex Civ App. 1962); Connell v. State, 371 S.W.2d 45 
(Tex. Crim. 1964); Thompson v. City of Huntsville, 329 
So.2d 664 (Crim.App. 1976); Oueilhe v. Lovell, 560 
P.2d 1348 (.Nev.Sup.Ct. 1977}. 
The United States Supreme Court has aditionally 
determined that opposite-sex massage ordinances do not 
violate the Constitution of the United States in either 
-3-
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limiting equal protection or abridging due process 
clauses. In Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 95 S.Ct. 
2281, 45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975), the Supreme court dismissed 
the case for want of a substantial federal question, 
such dismissal affirming that opposite-sex massage 
ordinances did not violate the United States 
Constitution. Other cases were dismissed on the 
same basis and include: Patterson v. Dallas, supra, 
Kisley v. Falls Church, 212 Va. 693, 187 S.E.2d 168 
{Va.Sup.Ct. 1972), 409 U.S. 907, 93 S.Ct. 237, 34 L.Ed 2d 
169 (1972); Smith v. Keator, 285 N.C. 530, 206 S.E. 
2d 203, {N.C. Sup. Ct. 1974), 419 U.S. 1043, 95 S.Ct. 613, 
42 L.Ed. 2d 636 (1974); Rubenstein v. Township of 
Cherry Hill, No. 10,027, unreported, (N.J. Sup.Ct. 1974), 
41 7 U . S • 9 6 3 , 9 4 S . Ct • 316 5 , 4 1 L . Ed • 2 d 11 3 6 { 19 7 4 ) ; 
City of Indianapolis v. Wright, 371 N.E. 2d 1298 
(Ind. Sup.Ct. 1977), 439 U.S. 804, 99 s.ct. 60, 58 L.Ed 
2d 97 ( 1978) • 
Hogge v. Johnson, 526 F.2d 833 (4th Circuit 1975), 
cert. denied, 428 u.s. 913, 96 s.ct. 3228, 49 L.Ed 2d 
1221, at page 835, summarized the reasoning behind a 
federal court dismissal based on lack of a substantial 
federal question: 
Quite recently, the Uni~ed States Supreme Court 
has spoken to the q~estion ar.tong the circuits with 
respect to the meaning to be accorded dismissal 
-4-
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for want of a substantial federal question. 
Such a dismissal is a decision on the merits 
binding upon the inferior federal courts. 
It is stare decisis on issues properly 
presented to the court an~ declared by that 
court to be without substance. 
The decision in Hogge v. Johnson, supra, regarding 
lack of a substantial federal question, influenced 
later decisions on the question of appeals on the 
grounds of constitutionality. Colorado Springs Amusements, 
Ltd. v. Rizzo, 387 F.Supp. 690 (E .. D. Pa. 19741, rev'd 
524 F.2d 571 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 
913, 96 S.Ct. 3228, 49 L.Ed 2d 1222., challenges Philadelphia's 
opposite-sex massage parlor ordinances charging that 
assumptions were made as to 1) group characteristics 
rather than the merits of the individual, 2) illicit 
sexual conduct occurring as a result of a massage by 
a member of the opposite sex, 3) and that the ordinance 
violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by forcing them 
to discriminate in their hiring, among others. 
After reviewing the arguments of the case, the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated at 524 F.2d 576: 
By parity of reasoning, we are not free to disregard 
three dismissals by the Supreme Court for want 
of a substantial federal question, of challenges 
to the ordinances identical in all material respects 
to the one in qu~stion here. A reading of the appeal 
papers shows that the orders dismissing the appeals 
are precedent for rejecting all but two of the 
contentions raised in opposition to section 
-5-
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9-610(4) of the Philadelphia Code •.• our 
reason in reaching this conclusion is 
supported by the similar approach taken by 
the Fourth Circuit Court in its recent 
decision in Hogge v. Johnson. 
Only two cases currently exist which have not 
been directly overturned which hold such ordinances 
unconstitutio~al: J.S.K. Enterprises, Inc. v. Lacey, 
6 Wash.App. 43, 492 P.2d 600 (Ct.App. 1971), and 
City and Countv nf Denver v. Nielson, 572 P.2d 434 (Coln. 
Sup.Ct. 1977). The J.S.K. Enterprises decision was made 
prior to the United States Supreme Court's dismissal 
for lack of ,a substantial federal question ground, and 
has been vitiated by the same. 
In the cRse of City and County of Denver v. Nielson, 
however, the decision that opposite-sex ordinances were 
unconstitutional was based on the Constitution of the 
state of Colorado, and not on that of the United States; 
the decision; then, being based solely on the laws and 
interpretations of a single jurisdiction. 
Clearly, the roots of constitutionality in legislating 
opposite-sex massages have been established, and the 
State of Utah, and the City of South Salt Lake are within 
well established boundaries of legality in attempting to 
regulate such ordinances. 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT II. THE SOUTH SALT LAKE MASSAGE ORDINANCES DONDT 
VIOLATE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS. 
In order to appropriately address the appellants' 
arguments on this point, it is necessary to establish 
the boundaries in which Utah defines unconstitutional 
discrimination. 
State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P.2d 920 (1938) 
at page 920 set the following precedent: 
to be unconstitutional as discriminatory, the 
discrimination of a statute must be unreasonable 
or arbitrary and a classification is never 
unreasonable or arbitrary in its inclusion or 
exclusion features so long as there is some basis 
for the differentiation between classes or subject 
matters included as compared to those excluded from 
its operation and if the differentiation bears a 
reasonable relation to the purposes to be 
accomplished by the statute. Const. U.S. Amendment 
14, Section 1. 
Within the ordinance adopted by the City of 
South Salt Lake regarding opposite-sex massages, masseuses 
and masseurs are treated equally. It applies equally to 
both men and women. In a similar case in the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina, Smith v. Keator, supra, the court 
approved the restrictions of the ordinances: 
The ordinance applies equally to both men and 
women ..• the barrier erected by the ordinance 
against immoral acts likely to result from too 
intimate familiarity of the sexes is no more 
than a reasonable regulation imposed by the 
city council in the fair exercise of police 
-1~ 
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powers ••• there is nothing in the ordinance 
that denies equal protection guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment. It applies to 
all alike who give massages for hire and 
who are not licensed to practice one of the 
arts of healing •.• 
Again, in the case of Patterson v. City of 
Dallas, supra, this premise was supported, and the 
court held the ordinance was valid when it stated 
at 842: 
The ordinance applies alike to both men and 
women. If petitioner should receive only 
male patrons and do his own work or employ 
only masseurs, he would not violate the 
ordinance. If he should receive only female 
patrons and err.ploy only masseuses to do his 
work, there would be no violation. The 
barrier erected by the ordinance against 
immoral acts likely to result from too 
intimate familiarity of the sexes is no 
more than a reasonable regulation imposed by 
the city council in the fair exercise of 
police powers. 
In the landmark case of Ex parte Maki, supra, the 
appellant argued violation of anti-discriminat~on ~c~s 
found.under Section 18, Article 20 of the Constitution. 
The court, however, declared that the ordinance did not 
disqualify, on the account of sex, any person from 
entering or pursuing any lawful business, ~ocation, or 
profession because the ordinance did not challenge the 
right of either man or woman to work as a masseur or to 
own such a business. On that ground, there is no 
discrimination. 
-8-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellants argue that the ordinance is void 
as a denial of due process, and is thus contrary to 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The case of Smith v. Keator, 
supra, dealing with the constituionality of opposite-sex 
massage noted the following at page 209: 
"Class legislation" is not offensive to the 
Constitution when the classification is based 
on a reasonable distinction and the law is 
made to apply uniformly to all the members of 
the class affected. Or, as the principle is more 
often expressed, when the law applies uniformly to 
all persons in like situation--which of itself 
implies that the classification must have a 
reasonable basis, without arbitrary discrimination 
between those in like situations. 
The appellants' argument t~at the City Ordinance 
unreasonably infringes upon the right of contract 
has no substantial basis. Notwithstanding the 
ordinance, a licensed masseur may spend all of his time 
massaging men, and may employ a masseuse to massage 
any woman requesting treatment. Neither the state no--: 
the federal constitution guarantees to a person unrestricted 
license in pursuing any line of business that he wishes, 
as he wishes to do so. The state may have conditions on 
that right, and may apply such restrictions to massage 
parlors, just as it does to doctors, lawyers, or 
garbage collectors. As long as the regulatory laws are 
not the the result of benefit of private interest, unfair, 
or without justifiable ends, regulations are constitutional 
-9-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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and enforceable. Further, because the City has found it 
necessary to regulate the business of massage parlors, 
but has not comprehended every possible evil that it 
must legislate, does not negate the need for, nor the 
impact of enacted ordinances. 
Finally, to counter the argument concerning a class 
being characterized, rather than an individual on the 
basis of his/her own merit, and to counter the 
argument that because of class characterization, 
those honorable, moral, and ethical practitioners are 
subjected to regulations designed to prevent immoral acts, 
findings by the legislative body to concur, 
historically, that the existence of an evil in connection 
with massage parlors ·is widespread. This is sufficient 
answer to the complaint of one engaged in the 
business, even though he is himself honorable. He is not 
deprived of his property because he must conform to such 
legialation. His own compliance with such measures should 
be considered a privelege and a protection against the 
further corruption of his legitimate business. 
-10-
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POINT III. THE SOUTH SALT LAKE MASSAGE ORDINANCES 
ARE A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER. 
The state codes and the judicial decisions of 
Utah have historically supported the fact that the exercise 
of police power is valid when regulating massage parlor 
business. 
Citing the same case which the appellants have 
used in arguing this point (p. 11, Brief of Appellant), 
Hart Health Studio v. Salt Lake County, 577 P.2d 116 
(Utah 1978) at 118, the court's opinion was clearly 
in favor of police regulation: 
It is fundamental that the regulation of 
business--and specifically this type of 
business--is within the police power 
of the state •.. (Emphasis added}. 
This case alone is enough to validate the argument 
in favor of the respondent as a clear statement of 
the Utah Court's sentiment. Further confirmation of 
this expressed authority are upheld in additional 
decisions. Salt Lake City v. Allred, 437 P.2d 434 (Utah 
1968) at page 434 states: 
It is proper exercise of statutory grant of 
police power to municipalities to preserve 
and protect public morals, and any practice 
of business which has tendency to weaken or 
corrupt morals of those who follow it, 
as shown by experience, is such conduct as 
affects "public morals." U.C.A. 1953, 10-8-84. 
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When rendering the decision on Salt Lake City v. 
Allred, the court applied the findings of Salt Lake 
City v. Kusse, 97 Utah 113, P.2d 671 (1938), that found 
the grant of general police powers to cities under 
predecessor statutes to Section 10-8-84, U.C.A. 1953, it 
would appear reasonable that sexual intercourse for hire 
and related offenses would be included in such general 
police power. 
The protection of public morals has always been 
a matter of local concern requiring regulation by 
municipalities. It properly falls within the scope of 
the police power pertaining to public morals. 
Other cases considering similar legislation 
reached the same conclusion. j.s.K. Enterprises, Inc. 
v. City of Lacey, supra, at page 600 determined two 
significant points: 
and, 
1) A city, in exercise of its police power, 
may regulate massagists on grounds of public 
health, safety and morality •.• 
2} Police Power regulation is subject to 
provisions of state and federal constitutions 
prohibiting granting of special privileges and 
immunities and guaranteeing equal protection of 
laws, but within limits of such restrictive 
rules, legislative body has a wide measure of 
discretion and its determination cannot be 
successfully attacked unless it is manifest 
arbitrary, unreasonable, inequitable, and unjust 
(.Emphasis added). • 
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Ex Parte Maki, supra, at page 64, affirms that the 
imposition of such ordinances by a city council is in 
fair exercise of police powers, and that such 
regulation by police powers to maintain the moral 
welfare does not arbitrarily deprive a person engaged in 
a regulated business of his property without "due 
process of law" (Const. Art I, Section 13, u.s.c.A. 
Const. Amend. 14. sec. 1). 
Finally, Smith v. Keator, supra, at page 207: 
••• after noting that the California case 
of Ex parte Maki, supra, was so well decided 
that it was decisive of the appeal before 
them, held that a city ordinance declaring 
that it was unlawful to administrer a massage 
to any person of the opposite sex was 
a fair exercise of the police power of the 
city and that did not violate any constitutional 
rights of the licensees of the massage 
establishment. 
-13-
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POINT IV. THE SOUTH SALT LAKE MASSAGE ORDINANCES 
ARE NOT IN CONFLICT WITH UTAH STATE LAW. 
In laying a foundation on the basic premises of 
this argument, it is important to note two precedents 
determined in the case of Salt Lake City v. Allred, 
supra, at page 434, in relation to city/state legislation: 
and, 
1) There is nothing in state statutes regulating 
sexual offenses that evidences any express 
or implied intent to preclude local governments 
from also attempting to prohibit and suppre33 
the difficult problem of the sex offender. 
U.C.A. 1953, 76-53-8 to 76-53-12 
2) City has the right to legislate on the 
same subject as state statutes where either 
general police power or e~press grant of 
authority is conferred upon municipalities. 
South Salt Lake, in forming legislation dealing 
with opposite-sex massages, is in harmony with the 
above decision. Appellants argue that South 
Salt Lake has adopted an ordinance "in direct conflict 
with the State of Utah" because prostitution means 
one thing to the State of Utah and "in South Salt Lake, 
it means far more." The courts have not found such 
expansions of definitions either inconsistent or against 
legislation. 
In State v. Salt Lake City, 21 Utah 2d 318, 
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445 P.2d 691 (1968), at page 691, the Supreme Court 
of Utah sununarizes their position: 
••• where legislature prohibits citizens 
from doing some act, there is no basis 
to imply that the legislature intended 
that cities and counties should not add 
additional prohibitions. 
By expanding the definition of "prostitution," 
South Salt Lake has, indeed, added prohibitions, and 
is therefore within their legal rights as a municipaiity. 
This concept is in accordance with Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 
supra, where the Utah Supreme Court, in commenting on 
various tests to determine whether there is a conflict 
between the statute and the ord~nance voiced the following 
with approval: 
The city does not attempt to authorize by 
this ordinance what the legislature has forbidden; 
nor does it forbid what the legislature has 
expressly licensed, authorized, or required. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has also determined 
in the case of Layton City v. Speth, 578 P.2d 828, (Utah 
1978} at page 831, the following: 
Cities are empowered by statute to pass all 
ordinances, rules, and regulations for carrying 
into effect all powers and duties conferred and 
such as are necessary and proper to provide for the 
safety, preserve the health, promote the prosperity, 
and improve the morals, peace and good order, comfort 
and convenience of the city and its inhabitants. 
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Appellant has argued that this ordinance has 
exceeded the scope of this definition and is inconsistent 
and in conflict with the state laws. Appellants argue 
that the ordinance attempts to make crimes of acts which 
are not crimes under state laws. A review of the South 
Salt Lake Ordinances and the relevant sections of the 
state laws pertaining to sexual offenses (76-53-8 through 
76-53-12) U.C.A. 1953, reveals that both the city 
ordinance and the state statute have the common purpose 
of defeating the practice of business or prostitution 
or the vice of sexual intercourse for hire and 
are closely related in subject matter. 
Salt Lake City v. Allred provides the Supreme 
Court opinion on the matter: 
The mere fact that an act denounced as 
a crime under the ordinance which is not 
denounced as a crime under the statute 
would not necessarily render the act 
under the ordinance inconsistent 
with the statute whereas here the ordinance 
is within the scope of state law dealing 
with· the same related subject of sexual 
offenses and is in no way repugnant to, 
but on the other hand is in harmony with 
the state laws. 
-16-
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POINT V. 3B-8-5{3) OF THE SOUTH SALT LAKE MASSAGE 
ORDINANCES IS SPECIFIC IN ITS DESCRIPTION OF PROSCRIBED 
CONDUCT AND THUS CANNOT BE VAGUE. 
3B-8-5{3) of the South Salt Lake Ordinances provides 
"that it shall be unlawful for a masseur to touch or 
offer to touch or massage the genitalia of customers." 
Appellants argue that this provision of the South 
Salt Lake Ordinances is unconstitutional because of 
vagueness. The issue of vagueness is best exp.L1inc:d by 
the standard which Utah has applied in various cases: 
If the statute is so designed that persons 
of ordinary intelligence, who would be law abiding 
can tell what their conduct must be to conform to 
its requirements, and it is susceptible of uniform 
interpretation and application by those charged with 
the responsibility of enforcing it, it is 
invulnerable to an attack for vagueness. 
See Kent Club v. Toronto, 6 Utah 2d 67, 72, 305 P.2d 
870, 874 {1957}; State v. Packard, 122 Utah, 369, 376, 
250 P.2d 561, 564 {1952); Henrie v. Rocky Moun~ain Packing 
Corp., 113 Utah 444, 448, 202 P.2d 727, 729 (1949). 
Applying the standard to the South Salt Lake Ordinance 
JB-8-5(3) it is clear to a person of ordinary intelligence 
which conduct is unacceptable under the ordinance. 
Appellants cite Champlin Re.fining Co. v. Corporation 
com, 286 us 210, 76 L.Ed. 1062, 52 s.ct. 559 (1932) 
and Jensen v. Salt Lake County, previously cited, to support 
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the claim of vagueness. Champlin concerned an Oklahoma 
Oil Regulation, Jensen concerned licensing. Appellants 
do not show how the vagueness issue in either case influenc 
the alleged vagueness in the South Salt Lake Ordinance. 
Appellants also support their claim of vagueness 
by calling upon two South Salt Lake City cases which were 
tried in a Court of the Justice of the Peace. Both 
cases alleged violations of 3B-8-5(3). Appellants 
cite City of South Salt Lake v. Susan Mae Rosvall 
No. 79-6559 and one other case. No citation or defendant's 
name is provided in the second case. 
In Rosvall, appell~ts assert that the ordinance 
does not require the act to be a commercial act for 
a fee and that the offer to touch need not be confined 
to the massage establishment. Appellants assume this 
interpretation because their jury instruction was 
rejected. In fact, the complaint against Rosvall specif~ 
the date, time, and place of occurrance. The 0mplaint 
specifies that the act occurred at a massage establishment, 
while Rosvall was acting as a masseur, and that Rosvall 
offered to touch the genitalia of a customer. Appellants 
construct their analysis of the ordinance on the basis 
of their interpretation of what a jury instruction should 
have read. 
In the second case, defendant was charged with 
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violations of 3B-8-5(3). Defendant, through counsel, 
urged a jury instruction requiring the defendant actually 
touch the genitalia before she could be convicted. 
The instruction was rejected. Again, appellants base 
the vagueness issue of the ordinance on their 
interpretation of a rejected jury instruction. 
Neither case was conducted in a court of record. 
The actual reason for rejection of the instructions, and 
the judge's interpretation of the ordinance are not 
available. 
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POINT VI. THE CITY OF SOUTH SALT LAKE MAY ESTABLISH 
MINIMUM AGE STANDARDS FOR MASSAGE PARLOR LICENSEES. 
Section 3B-8-3(1) 6£ the South Salt Lake Massage 
Ordinances provides that each individual desiring a 
massage establishment license or masseur license shall 
"be an individual at least 21 years of age." 
The City of South Salt Lake has a responsibility 
to protect the morals, health, and.welfare of the 
community. The massage ordinances, including th~ crdliunce 
in question, were fashioned for the purpose of fulfilling 
those responsibilities. 
The minimum age requirement is a reasonable 
attempt of the City to regulate the massage parlor 
business. 1nlere is a legitimate relationship between 
the City's obligations to the community and the 
ordinance it has enacted to achieve that end. 
The City of South Salt Lake also has an interest in 
protecting minors from possible sexual exploitation in 
the massage parlor establishments. 
There are numerous precedents for the establishment 
of a minimum age requirement. Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 58-2-1 et seq. provides that persons seeking 
licenses for various occupations must be 21 years of 
age, including architects, embalmers, barbers, chiropod~tl 
dentists, surveyors, etc. 
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The same minimum age requirement has been enforced 
with regards to consumption of alcohol. 
In Purdie v. University of Utah, 584 P.2d 831 
(Utah 1978) , the court held that age may be a valid 
classification as long as the reason for the classification 
is based on a legitimate state interest. 
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POINT VII. CIVIL SANCTIONS ANO PENALTIES INCLUDED IN 
THE SOUTH SALT LAKE MASSAGE ORDINANCES 00 NOT CONFLICT 
WITH EXISTING STATE CONSPIRACY STATUTES. 
JB-8-7 and JB-8-8 of the South Salt Lake Massage 
Ordinances provide for civil sanctions and penalties 
against the holder of a massage establishment license 
"for any and all violations of the provisions of this 
ordinance committed by his or her employees." Sanctions 
include license suspension or revocation and fines. 
Appellants argue that this ordinance is 
contrary to Utah State Law. Appellants cite a section 
of the State Criminal Code dealing with conspiracies, 
76-4-201: 
For purposes of this part, a person is guilty 
of conspiracy when he, intending that conduct 
constituting a crime be performed, agrees with 
one or more persons to engage in or cause the 
performance of such and any one of them commits 
an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy, 
except where the offense is a capital offense, 
a felony against the person, arson, burglary, or 
robbery, the overt act is not required for the 
commission of conspiracy. 
This section is limited to Part 2 Chapter 4 of the 
Utah Criminal Code. The controlling language of the 
conspiracy statute is encompassed within the first 
five words, "For purposes of this part." careful 
examination of the appellants brief will show that 
these words have been eliminated or omitted from their 
discussion of the statute. 
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Since this statute is limited in its application, 
it does not prohibit cities from enacting ordinances 
which hold licensees accountable for the conduct of 
employees on the premises. 
Specifically, the legislature has enacted statutes 
that do hold licensees accountable for the conduct of 
persons on their premises. A licensee may be held 
responsible for persons who are drunk on his premises 
(See U.C.A. 32-7-24). A licensee may also be h~ld 
responsible for permitting persons to consume beer 
on his premises. (U.C.A. 32-7-19). 
Courts have upheld convictions of licensees who 
were charged for the conduct of their employees. 
See Brodsky v. California State Board of Pharmacy, 
344 P.2d 68 (Cal. 1959) and Clown's Den, Inc. v. Canjar, 
518 P.2d 957 (Colo Ct. App, 1973). 
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POINT VIII. THE UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE HAS AUTHORIZED 
THE CITY OF SOUTH SALT LAKE TO REGULATE LIQUOR IN 
MASSAGE PARLORS. 
Section 3B-8-5{2) of the South Salt Lake Massage 
Ordinances makes it unlawful to "serve, to store, or 
allow to be served, or allow to be consumed, any alcoholic 
beverages on the licensed premises of a massage establishmen 
Appellant contends that this is an invalid attempt 
to regulate liquor, an area of law that is pr~ern;;:ited 
by Utah State Law. In defense of their position, 
appellants cite so-called concessions of invalidity 
made by Salt Lake County during their memorandum to the 
3rd Judicial Court. Appellants wrongly assume in their 
brief that because South Salt ·Lake has adopted the 
·wording in the County Statute, the City is also willing 
to make identical concessions about the statute's validi~. 
On the contrary, the City of South Salt Lake 
maintains that the power to regulate liquor on the licens~ 
premises of a massage establishment is well founded in 
statutory and case law. Chapter 8 of the Utah Code 
Annotated describes the power which has been reserved 
for the cities in regulating liquor: 
They may prohibit, e~cept as provided by 
law, any person from knowingly having in his 
possession any intoxica~ing liquor, and the 
manufacture, sale, keeping or storing for sale, 
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offering or exposing for sale, importing, 
carrying, transporting, advertising, 
distributing, giving away, exchanging, dispensing, 
or serving of intoxicating liquors (U.C.A. 10-8-42) 
Cities may enforce the same punishments and 
prohibitions which are enforced by state law when they 
occur within the jurisdiction of the municipality. 
See American Fork City v. Charlier, 43 U 231, 134 P 739; 
Tooele City v. Hoffman, 42 u. 596, 134 P. 558, and 
American Fork City v. Briggs, 43 u. 252, 134 P. 747. 
Cities may not enforce liquor ordinances where 
there is a conflict between the city ordinance and the 
state statutes. Rogue v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 
500 P.2d 509 (1972) upheld the right of local authorities 
to regulate the establishment of liquor stores through 
zoning ordinances. The decision overturned the rule 
outlined in Salt Lake County v. Liquor Control Conunission, 
357 P.2d 488 (1960), a case which appellants in Redwood Gym 
cite. 
Appellants in the South Salt Lake case do not 
address state statutes in this area of law, nor do they 
demonstrate a conflict in light of existing case law. 
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POINT IX. THE CITY OF SOUTH SALT LAKE MAY REGULATE 
THE SANITARY CONDITIONS OF MASSAGE PARLORS IN THE 
INTEREST OF PUBLIC HEALTH. 
Section JB-8-4 of the South Salt Lake Massage 
Ordinances provides: "All applications for a massage 
establishment license shall be referred to the Salt Lake 
City-County Board of Health for investigation and 
a license shall be granted only after a finding by 
the Salt Lake City-County Board of Health that th~ 
proposed premises are sanitary enough to conduct 
business therein without jeopardizing the public 
health." 
Appellants argue that this ordinance is beyond 
the delegated authority of cities and that it is 
unconstitutionally vague. 
Indeed, the sanitary conditions in a massage 
parlor establishment are well within the areas of 
public health and welfare that the cities are obliged 
to protect (See U.C.A. 10-8-84}. 
With respect to vagueness, the appellants do not 
have standing to object to the ordinance unless they can 
show they are prejudiced by the ordinance or, are about 
to be prejudiced by it. 
Several cases isolate the effect a statute must 
have on a party before it can be deemed unconstitutionally 
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vague. Consider the language in Cavaness v. Cox, 
598 P.2d 349 (1979) 351-52: 
The constitutionality of a statute is to 
be considered in the light of the standing of 
the party who seeks to raise the question and 
of its particular application; and a person may 
challenge the constitutionality of a statute 
only when and as far as it is being, or is 
about to be applied to his disadvantage. 
This court took a similar position in State v. 
Kallas when it held: 
This court is committed to the rule that 
an attack on the validity of a statute cannot 
be made by parties whose interests have not been, 
and are not about to be, prejudiced by the 
operation of the statute. 
The Court has explained its position if 
appellants do not satisfy this requirement of 
standing. See Peck v. Dunn, 574 P.2d 367 (1978) p. 369: 
In regard to plaintiff's contention, these 
things are to be said generally about the 
interpretations and application of a statute or 
ordinance: it is not our duty to indulge in 
conjecture that the statute may be so distorted 
or unreasonably applied that some innocent person 
might come within its terms. Rather, it is our 
duty to assume that those who administer a statute 
will do so with reason and common sense, in 
accordance with its language and intent; and further, 
that if there is a choice as to the matter of its 
interpretation and application, that should be done 
in a manner which will make it constitutional, as 
opposed to one which would make it invalid. 
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The City of South Salt Lake has not revoked 
the license of any massage parlor because of violations 
of this ordinance. There are no cases pending where 
violations of this ordinance may result in the 
suspension or revocation of any licensed massage 
parlor. No licenses have been denied on this basis. 
At best, the appellants are speculating that 
their establishment may at some future time violate 
this ordinance. 
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POINT X. THE PROVISIONS OF THE SOUTH SALT LAKE 
MASSAGE ORDINANCES ARE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT. INDIVIDUAL 
PROVISIONS OF THE ACT REMAIN IN EFFECT EVEN THOUGH OTHERS 
MAY BE DEEMED INVALID. 
Section 3B-8-9 of the South Salt Lake Ordinances 
provides: "In the event that any provision of this 
ordinance is declared invalid for any reason, the 
remaining sections shall remain in effect." 
There are numerous provisions of the South Salt 
Lake Ordinances that deal with varying aspects of 
the Massage Parlor business. This severability clause 
was incorporated into the ordinances should any portion 
of the act be declared invalid. The clause is inserted 
into the ordinances to voice. support for the individual 
ordinances as well as for the ordinances as a uniform body. 
Appellants argue that if one part of the South 
Salt Lake Ordinances is found to be invalid, the remaining 
provisions should likewise be invalidated because the 
provisions are interrelated. 
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that 
provisions of a legislative act remain in effect, even 
though a portion is held to be unconstitutional. 
In Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Com, previously 
cited, The Supreme court struck down a portion of an 
Oklahoma statute regulating the production of oil. 
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In so doing, the Court held: 
And if section 2 were to be held unconstitutional 
the provisions on which the orders rest would 
remain in force. The unconstitutionality of 
a part of an Act does not necessarily defeat or 
affect the validity of its remaining provisions. 
Unless it is evident that the legislature sould 
not have enacted those provisions which are within 
its power, independently of that which is not, the 
invalid part may be dropped if what is left is 
fully operative as a law. (p. 234) 
It is clear from this case that portions of the 
South Salt Lake Ordinances may still remain in effect 
even though a portion or portions are found to be 
invalid. A declaration that massaging the genitalia is 
invalid, does not invalidate provisions governinq licensi~, 
etc. The licensing requiremerits may remain operative as 
a law, regardless of the outcome of issues involving 
other provisions. 
Continuing in the Champlin decision, the Court said: 
Section 10 declares that the invalidity 
of any part of the Act shall not in ~ny manner 
affect the remaining portions. That discloses 
an intention to make the Act divisible and creates 
a presumption that, eliminating invalid parts, the 
legislature would have been satisfied with what 
remained and that the scheme of regulation 
derivable from the other provisions would 
have been enacted without regard to section 2. 
(p. 235) 
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CONCLUSION 
The South Salt Lake City Ordinances regulating 
massage parlors are a valid exercise of police power. 
Support for these ordinances is echoed in the 
decisions of other jurisdictions at the federal ~nd 
state levels. Massage parlor ordinances similar to 
the South Salt Lake Code have been sustained throughout 
this country. In fact, the propriety of such ordinances 
is now so well recognized that many courts have refused 
to rule on questions of their validity because they do not 
raise "substantial questions of constitutionality." 
The South Salt Lake Ordinances are in harmony 
with the U. s. Constitution and with existing state 
laws. 
The ordinances are clear in their intent. The 
Code applies equally to men and women. Provisions of 
the ordinances are also very specific in their descriptions 
of proscribed conduct. 
The City of South Salt Lake has a responsibility 
to safeguard the health and morals of the community. 
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These ordinances are a lawful and reasona~le means to 
that end. 
The decision of the Third Judicial Court of 
Utah should be upheld. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /be.- day of November, 1980, 
v clltOriBCi~ h =:-~~,/
Attorney for- ==nts-Respondents 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing 
BRIEF OF RESPONDEN~ were served by han.y1delivering 
the same on the~_ day of ~;'fjvL[~980, to 
the attorney for appellants: 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH 
930 South State Street Suite 10 
Orem, Utah 84057 
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